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Abstract
This paper presents results from a survey of Irish firms which was carried out in
late 2006 and early 2007. The survey was undertaken as part of a Euro-system
research network, the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). The aim of the survey
was to identify the sources and characteristics of wage and labour cost
dynamics that are most significant for monetary policy. It was found that close to
two-thirds of firms applied at least some aspects of the then national wage
agreement, Towards 2016. When wage agreements were made, they appear to
have been applied very extensively throughout Irish firms, with approximately 50
per cent of firms applying the agreement to their entire workforce.
Reflecting the considerably tighter labour market conditions during Celtic Tiger
times, wage cuts and wage freezes were very infrequently used by firms over
the past five years. However, this is not to say that Irish firms are in any way less
flexible than their European counterparts. When we look at a more structural
measure of flexibility, Irish firms are the least likely to rank regulations and
collective bargaining arrangements as important reasons for avoiding wage cuts
compared to the responses in other European countries. In all countries
participating, firms had common concerns about effort; morale and risk of losing
good employees that made them reluctant to reduce wages unless no
alternatives were available.
1 The authors are all economists in the Bank’s Economic Analysis and Research department. We would like to acknowledge the work of the head
and staff of now disbanded ESRI survey unit, who co-ordinated the survey fieldwork and provided valuable feedback on the survey instrument.
This work was undertaken as part of a Eurosystem research network, the Wage Dynamics Network, and we would also like to thank all of the
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1. Introduction
Understanding the processes that determine
wages is of considerable importance to central
banks. The extent to which wages are indexed
to inflation and the strength of the link between
a firm’s prices and wages, for example, have
consequences for inflation persistence and
may influence the probability of a negative
wage-price spiral. Information on the regularity
of wage changes and on the level of flexibility
available to firms to reduce their labour costs is
an indicator of how quickly an economy can
adjust to negative shocks. For these reasons,
this paper presents new facts on wage and
price setting practices from a survey of Irish
firms.
The results are derived from a survey of wage
setting carried out in late 2006 and early 2007
by the Central Bank, as part of a co-ordinated
research effort across the Euro system. The
survey was motivated by a general lack of
information on wage and price adjustment at
the level of the firm, and, in particular, the lack
of information that could be compared across
countries on a consistent basis. The survey
questionnaire was designed by NCB
representatives, with the aid of external experts
on labour markets and survey methodology.
This paper presents the results of the Irish
survey, and includes comparisons to results
from other participating countries on a number
of key issues. One advantage of the survey is
that it adds to our understanding of the forces
driving firm level responses to wage changes
such as those agreed under the national wage
agreements.
The structure of this paper is as follows;
Section 2 provides some further background on
the survey and on the layout of the
questionnaire sent to the surveyed firms.
Section 3 presents the results from questions
on the extent of collective bargaining
arrangements and how inflation is factored into
wage negotiations. Section 4 presents
evidence on the frequency of wage cuts and
freezes, and reasons firms rarely use such
methods even if cost reductions are sought.
Section 5 covers more flexible elements of pay,
such as bonuses, and how these can be used
as alternatives to reducing wages. Section 6
briefly describes some of the other initial
findings from the survey and Section 7
concludes.
2. Survey Design and Sample
Characteristics
The survey was divided into four sections.
1. The first section collected general
information on the firms involved in the
survey, such as the main activity of the
business, the number of employees,
vacancies, and a comparison of current
sales to those of the previous year.
2. The second section contained
questions on the wage setting
arrangements within the firm. Firms
were asked about their participation in
national wage agreements, timing of
wage changes, response of wages to
inflation and the contribution of bonuses
to the total wage bill.
3. Section three concentrated on how easy
or difficult it would be for the firm to
reduce labour costs, if necessary. The
first question in this section looked
directly for evidence of firms having cut
or frozen wages over the past five
years. Firms were then asked to
evaluate the relevance of a number of
statements on why cutting wages is
such a rare occurrence. This section
also examined how likely firms were to
use more flexible components of wages
(bonuses for example) as alternative
strategies to reduce labour costs
without changing wages.
4. The final section of the questionnaire
asked the firms about the frequency of
changes in the price of their main
product and about the strength of the
link between price setting arrangements
and wage setting.
The population for the survey was firms with 5
or more employees in private and commercial
semi-state sectors outside of agriculture. The
postal survey was carried out by the Economic
and Social Research Institute (ESRI). After
excluding all public sector organisations, the
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Table 1: Application of the National Wage Agreement — Towards 2016
Towards 2016 applied in full 35.6
Some aspects applied 26.0
Towards 2016 not applied 38.4
All firms 100.0
Table 2: Firm-level agreement vs. National Wage agreement
Towards 2016 Some aspects Towards 2016 not
applied in full applied applied
Firms with a firm-level agreement 66.9 17.7 15.4 100.0
(18.1)
Firms with no firm-level agreement 28.2 28.0 43.8 100.0
(81.9)
stratified the list by numbers employed, sector
and region. A total of 985 questionnaires were
completed, representing a response rate of 23
per cent.
3. Wage Structures and
Bargaining
This section of the paper addresses the issue
of wage setting through the survey’s questions
on wage negotiations and firms’ adherence to a
national wage agreement. These will be
compared with international evidence. In
particular the section examines how wage
rigidities arise when firms do not adjust wages
in response to labour market conditions.
Although collective bargaining has a number of
benefits, there are three channels through
which it can lead to wage rigidity. First,
collectively bargained wage agreements will
generally work to clarify expected wage
increases. Together with the use of inflation
indexation procedures, such agreements may
serve to prevent the possibility of a cut in real
wages or may only allow a very temporary
nominal wage freeze. Second, agreements
frequently enforce employment protection
rights that prevent firms from offering a lower
wage to contract workers or new hires in place
of incumbents.
2 Third, minimum wage levels
may be stipulated as part of most agreements.
These serve to present a de facto wage floor.
The recently-drafted partnership agreement for
Ireland was set in the context of achieving
2 Job protection clauses can create important hiring and firing costs
impeding labour market clearing.
aggregate wage restraint in the face of
pressures from inflation, an economic downturn
and the threat of higher unemployment. Its
predecessor, the Towards 2016 agreement,
prevailed during the survey. Over one-third of
firms apply the agreement in full. Our survey
results in Table 1 show that the practice of
wage negotiation is well established within Irish
firms: 62 per cent of firms surveyed apply at
least some aspects of the current national
wage agreement.
The existence of a firm-level bargaining
arrangement with its workers is one firm
characteristic that affects the likelihood of
following the national wage agreement.
According to Table 2, while almost one in five
(18.1 per cent) firms have their own firm-level
negotiation processes, the majority take the
national wage clauses into account. Only 2.8
per cent of firms relied fully on their own
internal formal wage negotiating process
without taking any account of the national wage
agreement. Of firms without their own specific
wage negotiating process, over half of these
applied at least some aspects of the national
wage agreement (Table 2).
Our survey found that when wage agreements
were made, they appear to have been applied
very extensively throughout Irish firms. Half of
firms with agreements apply them to their entire
workforce while the average value for workforce
coverage is 86 per cent. As the cross-country
shares of collective bargaining coverage
presented in Table 3 below shows, Ireland is
situated in the middle of the table with equal
shares of European countries having coverageWage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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Table 3: Collective Bargaining Coverage
Country Share of firms that applies Share of employees Share of firms having firm-
a collective bargaining covered by collective level bargaining agreement
agreement bargaining
Slovenia 1.00 N/A 0.257
Spain 1.00 0.968 0.169
Austria 0.911 0.946 0.233
Italy 0.928 0.922 0.429
Belgium 0.926 0.865 0.353
France 0.921 0.671 0.587
Portugal 0.901 0.900 0.901
Greece 0.870 0.909 0.208
Netherlands 0.703 0.676 0.301
Ireland 0.614 0.860 0.181
Czech R. 0.508 0.502 0.514
Hungary 0.351 0.415 0.322
Poland 0.221 0.193 0.214
Lithuania 0.225 0.156 0.237
Note: Weighted by size of country labour force. Countries ranked by collective agreement rate.
higher and lower than our coverage rate of 86
per cent of employees covered by a collective
wage agreement. However, if we exclude the
new member states from the comparison,
Ireland has one of the lowest shares of
collective bargaining by any of the measures
used in Table 3. Only the Netherlands has a
lower share of employees covered by collective
bargaining. The share of firms with a collective
bargaining agreement is over 90 per cent in 7
out of the 10 old member states in the survey,
compared to 61 per cent in Ireland.
Where there is less than a ‘blanket application’
of the agreement, the skill group of technically-
qualified workers and supervisory staff are the
most likely group collectively to be the
exception, as their average workforce
application rate is lower than the overall
average. In the tight labour market conditions
prevailing up to the time of the survey, this
group may have been the hardest to recruit
and retain and this may be reflected in a wage
premium over and above the wage increases
collectively agreed.
In nominal terms, average Euro zone wage
increases attributed to collective bargaining
was just below 3 per cent in 2006 and
increased slightly to exactly 3 per cent in 2007
while the figures for Ireland were 4 and 4.8 per
cent respectively for those years. The countries
with the highest nominal pay increases were
those of the newest Member states, Bulgaria
and Romania and the three Baltic Countries,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Ireland’s nominal
pay increases were in line with those of
selected EU15 countries including Spain,
Sweden and the UK. Most of the remaining
EU15 countries had agreed rises below 3 per
cent. In terms of real pay increases, the EU15
average real pay increase was 0.8 per cent in
2006 and in 2007 fell to 0.2 per cent. Ireland’s
collectively agreed wage increases, after
adjusting for inflation, was 1 per cent for 2006
and 1.3 per cent for 2007.
3.1 Comparative analysis of Towards 2016
firms
This section details the characteristics of firms
that applied at least some of the terms of the
National Wage Agreement. First, Table 4 looks
at some broad firm descriptives. Second, the
labour force details of firms who took at least
some terms of Towards 2016 on board are
compared with firms who did not apply any
aspects of that agreement in Table 5. Third, we
examine the trading and business performance
situation of the two groups of firms (Table 6).
Table 4 investigates whether there are
significant differences between firms adhering
to at least some aspects of the national wage
agreement and those who do not. Medium
sized firms make up a higher proportion of
firms applying the national wage agreement
(11.4 per cent) than of those that do not (7.5
per cent). Small and micro firms are somewhat
less likely to apply any of the terms of the
agreement. More manufacturing and
construction firms applied the agreement than
not but this difference is not statistically
significant. Services firms, on the other hand,
made up 43 per cent of firms with an
agreement but constituted well over halfWage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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Table 4: Characteristics of firms that apply at least some aspects of the National Wage agreement
National Wage Agreement NWA not applied
Size category (employees):
Micro 5-9 43.4 44.8
Small 10-50 44.3 47.2
Medium 50-250 11.4 7.5






Other services 43.2 55.1
100.0 100.0
Years Firm established:
Less than 2 years 3.9 3.8
2-10 years 21.4 19.7
10-20 years 24.1 40.6
20-50 years 40.2 31.9
50+ years 10.4 4.0
100.0 100.0
(55 per cent) of firms that did not apply it.
Firms who started operations less than 10
years ago make up the smallest share of those
having a wage negotiation process, while
established firms of 20 years or more have a
statistically higher likelihood of having a wage
negotiation process.
Labour force turnover was found to be slightly
lower in firms which applied the National Wage
agreement, while Table 5 also shows that the
recorded vacancy rate is very significantly
lower in NWA firms with 23 per cent of NWA
firms reporting they had vacancies compared
with 32 per cent of non NWA firms. High skill
occupational groups are the most likely groups
to not be subject to the National Wage
Table 5: Labour force situation of NWA firms vs. non NWA firms
NWA firms Non NWA firms
Labour turnover in past yr:
More staff 32.5 34.7
Less staff 18.8 16.8
No change in staff levels 48.7 48.5
100.0 100.0
Has unfilled vacancies 22.8 32.1
Occupational groups/Skill:
Low skill, blue collar 35.3 22.2
Low skill, white collar 21.1 22.0
High skill, blue collar 18.8 22.4
High skill, white collar 23.1 32.1
Average Tenure Distribution:
Less than one year 17.3 17.9
Between 1 and 5 years 35.6 38.5
Between 6 and 10 years 21.1 20.5
More than 10 years 24.8 21.3
Labour share of total cost 40.9 44.3
agreement. The most likely explanation for this
is that these groups may be the hardest to
recruit and retain and this may be reflected in a
wage premium over the wage increases
collectively agreed at the national level.
Nonetheless, the task of retaining staff appears
to be easier in firms with a wage agreement. It
is much more likely that staff with 10 years
tenure or more have benefited from the firm’s
application of the Towards 2016 agreement.
Firms which apply the national wage
agreement have a significantly lower labour
cost share than those who do not apply it for
either of two reasons: they are have higher
labour productivity (per employee employed) or
the firm manages to contain its labour cost
share through having known wage increases
agreed in advance, for example.Wage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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Table 6: Trading and performance situation of firms
NWA firms Non NWA firms
Share of workforce close to min wage 29.3 22.2
Sales/turnover position:
Lower than previous year 14.8 12.1
Higher than previous year 53.8 61.5
Export orientation:
Share of domestic sales 91.5 85.1
Sales outside EU 1.1 5.8
Competition
Strong/Severe 86.8 80.9
Weak/No competition 11.3 16.6
In Table 6 we tested to see if negotiated wages
respond to cyclical business conditions
reflected in performance-based indicators. Our
results show that firm performance and ability-
to-pay may not be the main driving force
behind having agreed pay structures. Wage
agreement firms are more likely to have a
significant share of their workforce paid within
10 per cent of the minimum wage and be less
export orientated than their non-NWA
counterparts. This may also be picking up that
services firms are less likely to apply the NWA.
Sales performance was less impressive in NWA
firms and these firms are most likely to be
facing strong or severe competition in their
trading environment. Traditionally firms with
collective agreements tend to out-perform their
non-wage agreement counterparts but our
results show that the best-performing firms in
our survey are most likely to not share these
rewards with their labour force. On the other
hand, we do not have an indicator of domestic
versus foreign ownership to test whether this
was a significant factor in this regard.
3.2 Wage changes and indexation policy
For the purposes of this research an indexation
policy is identified where wage changes are
automatically linked to inflation by a set of
predefined rules. International experience
Table 7: Accounting for inflation in wage-setting and indexation policy
Irish firms who adapt wages to inflation 28.6%
Of which:
Wage changes automatically linked to past inflation 19.3%
Wage changes automatically linked to expected inflation 8.0%
Past inflation taken into account 60.5%
Expected inflation taken into account 32.7%
Note: Some negotiated contracts use a mixture of past and expected inflation considerations explaining why the sum of
the row percentages in Table 7 exceeds 100 per cent.
shows that employees will become more
concerned about wages relative to other
workers and relative to the cost of living in
times when inflation puts pressure on nominal
wages. At the same time, the existence of
wage renegotiation costs makes lengthening
the duration of contracts desirable and agreed
indexation principles can overcome these
costs.
The survey found that 71 per cent of Irish firms
do not have a policy of automatically adapting
base wage rates to inflation. Of those that do
index wages to inflation with a formal rule (i.e.
an automatic link), the actual past inflation rate
is more likely to be used than any measure of
expected future inflation. However, firms were
considerably more likely to describe wage
changes as taking account of changes in the
general cost of living but not having a formal or
automatic rule with respect to inflation.
Given the relative stability of inflation in the
euro area context, it is not surprising that our
survey found a two-to-one split in favour of past
inflation over expected inflation where a less-
strict indexation policy is applied (i.e. not an
automatic adjustment but inflation ‘taken into
account’). It demonstrates that the variability of
inflation has not been a problem for wage
setting in Ireland during the period of this
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Table 8: Frequency of wage changes (for largest occupational group) due to inflation: difference
between NWA and non NWA firms
Column % National Wage Agreement Non-NWA
More than once a year 4.2 3.0
Once a year 54.2 59.6
Once every two years 7.8 8.1
Less frequently than 2 years 4.6 7.3
Never/Don’t Know 29.3 22.0
100.0 100.0
In recent national agreements, wage increases
became payable regardless of whether the
current economic environment was
characterised by moderate or persistent
inflation. A third of potential respondents in our
survey were not sure whether the wage
changes applied by their firm took inflation into
account or not. Results in Table 8 show that of
those who answered the question, NWA-firm
responses were slightly more likely to have
multiple inflation-driven wage increases in a
year. The frequency of inflation wage changes
was certainly less for non-NWA firms with the
majority concentrated on a single annual wage
change for inflation-purposes.
4. Wage Flexibility and Wage Cuts
This section examines the ability of firms to
reduce base wages and the alternative
methods firms can use to reduce labour costs
without directly cutting base wages. Base
wages were defined as wages and salaries
including commission and piecework payments
but excluding bonuses.
4.1 How common are wage cuts?
We asked firms if they had cut or frozen base
wages over the previous five years, and, if they
Table 9: Incidence of Wage Cuts and Freezes (Irish Survey results)
Percentage of Firms Wage Cuts Wage Freezes
Overall 2.1 7.1
Size category Micro, 5-9 2.7 7.0
Small, 10-49 0.9 6.1
Medium, 50-249 0.0 10.2
Large, 250+ 0.7 7.3
Sector Manufacturing 4.1 10.6
Construction 0.0 5.2
Trade/Distribution 1.0 5.8
Other services 2.5 7.3
had, what percentage of the workforce this
applied to (Table 4). Given that this question
covers a period of sustained economic growth,
it is not particularly surprising that wage cuts
are extremely rare, applying to slightly over 2
per cent of firms. These firms were mainly very
small — firms with between 5 and 9 employees
were the most likely to have cut wages with no
medium sized firms (50 to 249 employees)
reporting wage cuts and less than one per cent
of larger firms (over 250 employees). Most of
the firms that did cut wages were in
manufacturing. No wage cuts occurred in the
construction sector and very few were reported
in trade and distribution. The services sector
experienced wage cuts by 2.5 per cent of
firms. With regard to the percentage of the
firms workforce affected by wage cuts, this
ranged from 5 per cent to 100 per cent.
Wage freezes were more common than cuts,
but, at just over 7 per cent, still applied to a
relatively small group of firms. Unlike wage
cuts, wage freezes were not concentrated in
any one sector or size group, although they
were more common in manufacturing than in
other firms. If a wage freeze was implemented,
it was applied to the firms entire workforce in
two-thirds of cases.Wage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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There is a positive relationship between wage
cuts and firms reporting turnover lower than in
the previous year, although this finding is not
significant in a statistical sense if controls for
firm size and sector are included. As so few
firms report wage cuts, it is difficult to establish
robust statistical relationships with other
variables. More firms report having frozen
wages at some point and this larger sample
size allows for more reliable analysis of
contributing factors. Controlling for sector and
size effects, we find that firms experiencing
lower turnover are 10 per cent more likely to
have frozen wages than firms with the same or
higher turnover. Firms describing turnover as
‘‘much lower’’ were 12 per cent more likely to
freeze wages than those with turnover the
same or higher than the previous period.
Ireland’s percentage of firms reporting wage
cuts is amongst the lowest of the countries in
the sample, and is well below the average
value of 2.8 per cent (Table 10). The southern
European countries of Italy, Spain and Portugal
are the least likely to cut wages, and the
highest value is just over 7 per cent for France.
The variation across countries in the incidence
of wage freezes is considerably larger than for
wage cuts, ranging from 2.4 per cent in Spain
to over 20 per cent in the Czech Republic,
Estonia and the Netherlands. The average
percentage of firms to have frozen wages
across all the countries is 11.3 per cent. The
incidences of wage cuts and freezes in Ireland
are significantly lower than the European
Table 10: International Comparison of Wage Cuts and Freezes














All country average 2.8 11.3
average. This result is not that surprising given
the tight labour market conditions prevailing
during the period of this study. In contrast to
the finding above, recent OECD cross-country
analysis shows that Ireland scores highly in
terms of the structural and institutional elements
that contribute to labour market flexibility.
4.2 Firms’ reasons for avoiding cuts
The firms were asked: ‘‘There can be various
reasons as to why base wages are not, or only
very slightly cut, even if your firm needs to
reduce labour costs. Please indicate their
relevance in your company.’’ The following list
of reasons was provided:
• Impeded by labour regulation/collective
agreements.
• Negative impact on employees’ efforts,
resulting in less output.
• Negative impact on employees’ morale.
• Negative impact on the firm’s reputation
as an employer.
• Best employees would leave the firm.
• Increase costs of hiring and training new
employees.
• Difficulties in attracting new workers.
• Workers dislike unpredictable reductions
in income.
• Employees compare wages to similar
workers in other firms.Wage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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Table 11: International Comparison of Reasons for Avoiding Wage Cuts
Percentage of Firms indicating ‘‘Relevant’’ or ‘‘Very Relevant’’
Regulations Effort Morale Reputation Best Hiring Recruitment Implicit Comparisons
leave costs Contract
Ireland 22.9 79.8 76.1 61.0 79.1 56.1 64.6 78.8 75.7
Austria 77.0 89.8 87.3 64.4 84.6 77.2 47.8 41.8 67.5
Belgium 84.0 87.6 88.1 55.9 81.1 65.7 72.6 81.4 67.7
Czech R. 56.0 85.8 82.7 69.0 94.7 87.2 82.1 46.4 77.7
Estonia 53.6 89.9 89.6 83.5 94.2 91.0 87.1 53.6 80.1
Spain 91.2 72.0 NA 43.3 69.5 54.1 59.6 71.4 50.3
France 78.2 90.9 90.4 51.3 79.0 37.6 68.8 22.1 47.1
Hungary 43.1 80.3 81.7 55.9 71.0 47.8 45.7 79.6 74.1
Italy 87.8 85.2 NA 58.2 89.6 86.2 71.1 29.3 70.4
Netherlands 63.5 78.2 NA 64.1 76.6 61.7 78.6 77.5 69.3
Poland 34.1 71.5 91.6 60.6 89.2 67.1 76.1 71.6 53.9
Portugal 76.9 84.0 85.3 56.6 82.9 53.8 54.6 81.9 64.2
Slovenia 69.9 87.1 84.8 75.6 89.1 72.2 77.3 77.0 77.1
Average 64.5 83.2 85.8 61.5 83.1 66.0 68.2 62.5 67.3
Firms were asked to rank each one of these
explanations on a four-point scale of relevance.
Combining the relevant and very relevant
categories in Table 11, labour regulations and
collective agreements are regarded as the
least relevant of the barriers, while concerns
about reductions in employee effort and losing
talent are the most relevant reasons.
There was some variation in these rankings by
firm size, mainly in regard to the perceived
relevance of collective bargaining and
regulations. Over 45 per cent of the largest
firms regarded regulations and bargaining
arrangements as relevant compared to just 20
per cent of the smallest firms. In general, larger
firms were more likely to regard all of the
explanations for avoiding wage cuts as relevant
or very relevant. This is consistent with the
earlier result that small firms were more likely to
find it possible to cut wages if necessary.
Comparing the responses of Irish firms to those
in other European countries in Table 11, we
found common concerns about effort, morale
and risk of losing good employees. Irish firms
are the least likely to rank regulations and
collective bargaining arrangements as an
important reasons for avoiding wage cuts.
Exposure to future higher hiring costs or
difficulties in recruitment are also less likely to
be regarded as relevant by Irish firms
compared to those in other countries. On the
other hand, awareness of employees
comparing their wages to others and an
expectation on the part of the workers that
wages should be kept smooth (allowing profits
to vary instead) were ranked more highly by
Irish firms than the average across the other
surveyed countries.
5. Bonuses and Other Sources of
Flexible Pay
5.1 Wage bill composition
This section deals with the role of flexible pay
and bonuses. Firms might use these measures
as a means of achieving wage flexibility in the
presence of rigid base wage structures.
The results show that almost half of all firms (48
per cent) did not pay any performance-related
bonuses. Just over one-third of firms paid
bonuses based on individual performance and
one-quarter paid bonuses based on company
performance. There is some overlap in these
figures however, as 18 per cent of firms use
both types of bonus payment. Where bonuses
were paid, the average individual performance-
related bonus in 2006 was 7.5 per cent of a
firm’s total wage bill, while company
performance-related bonuses were just over 3
per cent of the total wage bill on average. The
total average share of bonuses in the wage bill
therefore comes to 10.8 per cent. This is very
close to the average bonus share, of 10.5 per
cent, that was paid by firms in the Euro area
countries that participated in the survey.
However, if we exclude Portugal, which has an
extremely high share of bonuses (almost 50 per
cent), the Euro area average drops to 8.2 per
cent. In the top quarter of Irish firms with the
largest share of bonuses in pay, flexible wage
components were found to represent more than
43 per cent of the total firm’s wage bill.Wage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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Table 12: Breakdown of the Energy Series
Production Technically- Clerical Highly- All
workers qualified/ staff qualified
Supervisory staff employees &
Management
Individual performance bonus 4.4 5.2 4.3 7.4 7.6
Company performance bonus 1.4 2.1 1.7 4.8 3.2
As expected, highly-qualified employees and
management are most likely to receive a bonus
element to their remuneration with production
and clerical workers less likely to be rewarded
for individual performance or receive a share in
overall company performance. Likewise, highly
qualified staff receive the highest level of
bonuses, receiving 7 per cent of the total wage
bill on average in individual performance
bonuses and 5 per cent of the total wage bill in
company-related performance bonuses when
payable (Table 12 above).
Relating bonus rates to tenure — the time an
employee has served at the firm — reveals that
production workers are more likely to share in
bonus schemes or profit sharing as time goes
on. This may operate as a staff retention
incentive, as firm-specific skills become more
valuable. Company performance payments
peak for new entrants when they are highly
qualified and/or management and may reflect
that flexible pay elements are an important
incentive used to attract this skill type in the
first instance. Firms that have a wage
negotiation process tend to pay a lower
percentage of their wage bill in bonuses.
5.2 Cost reduction strategies
Flexible wage components give firms additional
methods of adjustment if they need to reduce
costs when they cannot reduce base wages.
We identify the following main strategies to cut
labour costs (other than wages) and ask the
firms if they have used them:
• Reduce or eliminate bonus payments.
• Reduce or eliminate non-pay benefits.
Table 13: Alternative Labour Cost Reductions
All Firms 5-19 Emp. 20-49 Emp. 50-249 Emp. 250+ Emp.
Reduce bonuses 13.3 12.0 14.7 18.8 19.7
Reduce benefits 4.9 3.8 5.7 10.3 10.4
Change shifts 9.8 6.9 12.3 24.1 22.4
Slow promotions 4.7 3.4 5.5 11.5 11.3
Cheaper hires 27.5 22.7 35.4 42.8 45.6
Early retirement 3.9 2.4 5.3 9.6 17.5
• Change shift assignments or additional
payments for working shifts.
• Slow or freeze rate at which promotions
are filled.
• Recruit new employees at lower wage
level than those who left voluntarily.
• Encourage early retirement to replace
high wage employees by entrants with
lower wages.
The most commonly used strategy was to bring
in new recruits at a more junior level than
employees who had left the firm; this was used
by over 27 per cent of firms. Reductions in
bonuses were the next most commonly used
strategy, reported by 13.3 per cent of all firms.
If we restrict ourselves to look only at firms that
currently pay bonuses, 21 per cent report
reducing these bonuses in order to lower costs.
This was followed by changes in shift patterns
or premiums associated with shift-work. The
choice of strategy varies with the composition
of the workforce. Firms with a high percentage
of production workers were the most likely to
use changes in shifts, whereas firms with a
high percentage of professionally qualified
workers were the most likely to change
bonuses. This is related to the contribution
bonuses made to the total wage bill; firms in
which bonuses are a larger fraction of total
wages have more opportunity to use this option.
For each of the strategies, the percentage of
firms that had used them increased steadily with
firm size. Larger firms tend to have more
complex pay structures than smaller firms and
this gives them a greater element of flexibility
when it comes to using non-wage elements of
compensation to reduce costs.Wage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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Table 14: International Comparison of Labour Cost Reduction Strategies
Proportion of Firms by Country
Reduce Reduce Change Slow Cheaper Early
bonuses benefits shifts promotions hires retirement
Ireland 13.3 4.9 9.8 4.7 27.5 3.9
Belgium 18.4 7.9 7.2 15.0 26.4 18.9
Czech R. 32.2 7.5 11.1 1.9 8.7 8.9
Estonia 40.2 20.5 21.1 6.2 16.2 2.6
France 14.7 6.1 0.0 15.4 39.0 30.3
Hungary 22.7 11.9 38.3 35.1 26.5 10.2
Italy 25.6 21.8 26.0 34.0 45.6 20.2
Poland 22.8 15.2 11.9 12.3 22.1 9.5
Portugal 13.7 8.4 10.7 14.0 16.2 0.0
Slovenia 13.5 12.8 9.2 18.9 15.8 8.9
Average 21.7 11.7 14.5 15.7 24.4 11.3
The pattern of strategies used by firms to
reduce labour costs without cutting wages
varies quite considerably across countries. Irish
firms report lower than average usage of all but
one of the strategies; replacing workers who
leave the firm voluntarily with workers on a
lower wage has been used by 27.5 per cent of
Irish firms, some 3 per cent more than in other
countries. Firms in other countries are almost
twice as likely (on average) to reduce bonuses
and benefits compared to Irish firms, and were
three times more likely to use promotions and
retirement to reduce costs.
6. Other Findings from the Survey
This paper has presented initial results from a
survey on wage setting practices in Ireland. We
have focused on responses to questions on the
National Wage agreement, the incidence of
wage cuts and freezes and the use of flexible
elements of pay. This section briefly outlines
some of the other topics that were included in
the survey and preliminary findings that could
be explored in future research.
One set of questions attempted to clarify what
happens if firms did not cut wages, how might
they react to a negative shock. We asked firms
for their responses to two types of adverse
event, the first scenario was an unanticipated
slowdown in demand and the second was an
increase in the cost of an intermediate input
(such as an increase in oil prices). The main
reaction of firms, regardless of the source of
the shock, was to look for potential reductions
in non-labour costs. Three-quarters of firms
said that cost reductions would be of relevance
in how they responded to a slowdown in
demand for their own product. However, this
fell to 47 per cent if the shock was related to
an increase in the cost of an intermediate input.
In general, reducing output and/or lowering
margins were more likely to be identified as
sources of action following a demand
slowdown compared to an input cost increase.
A further set of questions examined the
relationship between price and wage dynamics
for the individual firms. The purpose of this was
to obtain some insight into the potential effect
of wage dynamics on inflation persistence.
Conversely it also allows for the effects of
inflation persistence may have on wage
dynamics to be analysed. To achieve this firms
were divided into two groups based on their
reported price setting behaviour. The first
group of firms are those firms that typically
change their output prices every quarter or
more frequently and the second group
contained firms having price changes that only
occur less than once a year. Firms were then
asked a further series of questions enabling
them to indicate how much competition they
faced in their particular market. Separating
firms by these additional categories highlights
how differences in the competitive market
environment may affect individual firm
behaviour.
The first conclusion drawn from the analysis
described above is that firms experiencing
more intense competition tend to have flexible
prices. This is verified by the finding that firms
whose price is flexible are also more likely to
attach importance to competitors’ prices in
deciding to increase or decrease their outputWage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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price. Second, firms whose price is flexible are
slightly less export-oriented. This latter factor is
compatible with the finding that they may have
sufficient market power in a domestic market
setting to set their own output (and market)
prices. Exporting firms tend to be price-takers
in a world market environment. Third, the
results show that firms whose price changes
less frequently (the second group) are much
more likely to have an automatic indexation link
between wages and inflation. They are
marginally more likely to have at least one
annual change in wages for inflation reasons.
The final set of questions reported in this
section looked for any link between marginal
cost pressures arising from wage changes and
it’s potential feed-through as output price
effects. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the time
period of this survey, no strong link between
the marginal cost pressures of wage changes
and it’s feed-through as output price effects
were reported by either type of firm.
7. Conclusion
The results presented in this paper are based
on a survey of Irish firms undertaken as part of
the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), which is a
Euro-system research network. The work was
motivated by a general lack of information on
wage and price adjustment at firm level, and, in
particular, the lack of information that could be
compared across countries on a consistent
basis. The aim of the survey was to identify the
sources and characteristics of wage and labour
cost dynamics that are most significant for
monetary policy. It also attempts to further
explain the relationship between wages, labour
costs and prices, both at the firm and macro-
economic level. The Central Bank carried out
this coordinated survey of wage setting in
Ireland in late 2006 and early 2007.
Obtaining a better understanding of the
processes that determine wages is of
considerable importance to policy makers and
central banks. Wages account for a significant
proportion of production costs for most goods
and services. The linkages from wages to
prices (through their effect on firm pricing
decisions) and from prices to wages (through
wage bargaining and indexation) are therefore
crucial components influencing inflation
persistence and the probability of a negative
wage-price spiral. Furthermore, the level of
flexibility available to firms to reduce their
labour costs is an indicator of how quickly an
economy can adjust to negative shocks.
Looking at the results of the Irish survey it was
found that close to two-thirds of firms applied
at least some aspects of the national wage
agreement, Towards 2016. When wage
agreements were made, they appear to have
been applied very extensively throughout Irish
firms, with approximately 50 per cent of firms
applying the agreement to their entire
workforce. Where there is less than a ‘blanket
application’ of the agreement, the skill group of
technically-qualified workers and supervisory
staff are the most likely group collectively to be
the exception. The most likely explanation for
this is that this group may have been the
hardest to recruit and retain and this may be
reflected in a wage premium over the wage
rate collectively agreed.
Reflecting the tight labour market conditions
during Celtic Tiger times, wage cuts and wage
freezes were very infrequently used by firms
over the past five years. This is not to say that
Irish firms in any way less flexible than their
European counterparts. Looking at a more
structural measure of flexibility, Irish firms are
the least likely to rank regulations and
collective bargaining arrangements as an
important reasons for avoiding wage cuts
compared to the responses in other European
countries. In all countries participating, firms
had common concerns about effort, morale and
risk of losing good employees that made them
reluctant to reduce wages unless no alternative
were available.
The results presented in this paper indicate
that there are several areas where further
research may provide useful additional
information about both wage and price
dynamics especially in changed economic
times. These include the coexistence of price
and wage rigidity placing considerable
pressure on firm profit margins; job losses and
turnover where total labour costs cannot be
reduced without reducing the size of the labour
force; and/or the scope for squeezing flexible
elements of pay in firms’ total costs.Wage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
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